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Abstract  
 
The inefficiencies of current spam filters against fraudulent (419) mails is not unrelated to the use by spammers of good-word 
attacks, topic drifts, parasitic spamming, wrong categorization and recategorization of electronic mails by e-mail clients and of 
course the fuzzy factors of greed and gullibility on the part of the recipients who responds to fraudulent spam mail offers.  In this 
paper, we establish that mail token manipulations remain, above any other tactics, the most potent tool used by Nigerian 
scammers to fool statistical spam filters. While hoping that the uncovering of these manipulative evidences will prove useful in 
future antispam research, our findings also sensitize spam filter developers on  the need to inculcate within their antispam 
architecture robust modules that can deal with the identified camouflages.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Some spammers are legitimate businesses, 
engaged in overly aggressive marketing 
efforts, because there are no formal limits on 
their actions. In spite of the challenges created 
by needing to work at an international level, 
there is a reasonable expectation that legal 
strictures, both laws and contracts, will 
constrain these businesses to a tolerable level 
[25]. In contrast, rogue spammers actively 
seek to avoid accountability, to subvert 
barriers to their traffic, and to acquire unwitting 
and unwilling participation of machines owned 
by others. Independent of the legal details, the 
best social model to use for analyzing this 
latter group is crime. Often the activities do not 
violate particular laws, but what is most 
important is that the style of a spammer’s 
conduct is the same as that of a criminal. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SPF Mechanism  
(Source: Wong & Schlit [29]) 
 
Unfortunately, the technical and operational 
world of spamming has also developed in 
scale and sophistication. Spamming used to 
entail one sender and one sending machine. 
Its performance was limited by the capacity of 
that machine and the bandwidth of its Internet 
connection. Today, rogue spammers control 
vast armies of compromised systems, called 
zombies, as shown in Figure 1. Zombies are 
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owned by legitimate users who are unaware 
that their system has been compromised and 
is being used for spamming. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Rogue Spammer Control Network 
 
The community of rogue spammers is 
remarkably well organized, and Nigerian 419 
spammers fall into this category [24]. It has 
become an extensive, underground economy. 
Some participants specialize in developing 
methods for breaking through filters. Others 
take over machines and turn them into 
zombies. Others sell the use of a zombie 
collection for periods of spamming. The 
estimated number of zombie systems is in the 
many tens of millions. After spam delivery, 
recipients often “click” to a transaction Web 
page. Web hosting is provided at multiple 
levels, in order to obscure the server side of 
the process, further reducing accountability. 
Typically, spammers have the classic goal of 
selling products. However, they also can have 
political or religious motivations or even 
blatantly criminal intent, such as extortion. The 
ability to send very large number of messages 
to a specific destination gives spammers a tool 
that can be used to threaten an organization 
with a denial of service attack on their network 
[25].  
 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
Spam behavior is not simply a matter of one 
concept drifting to another in succession, but 
instead it is a superimposition of constant, 
periodic and episodic phenomena [17]. 
Researchers have shown that spam content 
changes over time. Swan and Allan [26] 
employed a 2-t test to discover “bursty" topics 
in daily news stories. Their test was designed 
to determine whether the appearance of a 
term on a given day was statistically 
significant. They concluded that that spam has 
complex time-varying behavior. Some terms 
recur intermittently, such as adult, click,free, 
hot and removed. Others are episodic, for 
instance the terms common in a “Nigerian 419 
scam" such as Nigeria, Lagos, assistance, 
beneficiary and terms in a “pornstar video" 
such as awesome, pornstars, jenna, lauren, 
nicki, orgy  also burst at some points. Terms 
such as Christmas burst late in the year and 
presumably reappears every year around the 
same time.  
 
Spammers typically use purpose-built 
applications to distribute their spam [27]. 
Greylisting tries to deter spam by rejecting 
email from unfamiliar IP addresses, by replying 
with a soft fail (i.e. 4xx). It is built on the 
premise that the so-called ‘spamware’  does 
little or no error recovery, and will not retry to 
send the message. Any correct client should 
retry; however, some do not (either due to a 
bug or policy), so there is the potential to lose 
legitimate email. Also, legitimate email can be 
unnecessarily delayed; however, this is 
mitigated by source IP addresses being 
automatically whitelisted after they have 
successfully retried once. An analysis 
performed by Levine [28] over a 7-week period 
(covering 715,000 delivery attempts), 20% of 
attempts were greylisted; of those, only 16% 
retried. Careful system design can minimise 
the potential for lost legitimate email; certainly 
greylisting is an effective technique for 
rejecting spam generated by poorly 
implemented spamware. 
 
SMTP path analysis [21] learns the reputation 
of IP addresses and email domains by 
examining the paths used to transmit known 
legitimate and spam emails. It uses the 
‘received’ line that the SMTP protocol requires 
that each SMTP relay adds to the top of each 
email processed, which details its identity, the 
processing timestamp and the source of the 
message. Despite the fact that these headers 
can easily be spoofed, when operating in 
combination with a Bayesian filter, overall 
accuracy is approximately doubled.  
 
Tom [17] opined that it will be difficult to 
estimate how much we can expect spam as a 
concept to drift over time, in part because no 
metric of concept drift has been adopted by 
the antispam community. Cunningham et al. 
[18] construct a case-based reasoning 
classifier that can track concept drift. They 
propose that the classifier both adds new 
cases and removes old cases from the system 
collection, allowing the system to adapt to the 
drift of characteristics in both spam and 
legitimate mails. An initial evaluation of their 
classifier suggests that it outperforms naive 
Bayesian classification. This is unsurprising 
given that naive Bayesian filters attempt to 
learn a ‘‘unified spam concept’’ that will identify 
all spam emails; spam email differs 
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significantly depending on the product or 
service on offer. In [19]  the Teiresias pattern 
discovery algorithm was applied to email 
classification. Given a large collection of spam 
emails, the algorithm identifies patterns that 
appear more than twice in the corpus. 
Negative training occurs by running the pattern 
identification algorithm over legitimate email; 
patterns common to both corpora are removed 
from the spam vocabulary. Successful 
classification relies on training the system 
based on a comprehensive and representative 
collection of spam and legitimate emails. 
Experimental results are based on a training 
corpus of 88,000 pieces of spam and 
legitimate emails. Spam precision was 
reported at 96.56%, with a false positive rate 
of 0.066%. 
 
 
2.1 Techniques Adopted By the  
      Nigerian Spammers  
 
In order to reach a large volume of users, 
Spammers require an equally large number of 
e-mail addresses. These are usually collected 
in three different ways. By using mail 
harvesters to scavenge for e-mail addresses 
listed on web sites and message boards 
(particularly USENET groups), by performing a 
dictionary attack (pairing randomly generated 
usernames with known domain names to 
‘guess’ a correct address) or by purchasing 
address lists from other individuals or 
organizations. Once they have addresses, 
Spammers can use programs known as bulk 
mailers to automate the sending of Spam. 
These programs can send huge volumes of e-
mail messages in a small amount of time. 
Some bulk mailing programs use open-relays 
(e-mail servers that allow unauthorized users 
to send e-mail) to send messages, effectively 
hiding the true address of the Spammers. Bulk 
mailers can also fabricate the from address in 
e-mail message headers to further hide the 
identity of the Spammer [31].  
  
Another technique spammers utilize to send e-
mails is with the use of zombie networks, also 
know as bot networks. Zombie is the term 
given to a computer that has been infected by 
a virus, worm, or Trojan Horse, which allows 
remote entities to take control and use it for 
their own (usually illegal) purposes. A large 
amount of these computers, usually called a 
network or army can be co-opted to send 
spam e-mails, requiring little of the spammer’s 
own computing power and network bandwidth. 
This technique is also popular as it protects 
the identity of the spammer. What follows is a 
short summary of some of the major 
techniques and tactics adopted by the Nigerian 
419 scammer. 
 
2.2 Current Filters Against 419 Mails  
 
Dealing with the 419 Spam problem at the 
destination will not always yield the desired 
results as Spammers have evolved different 
measures to beat Spam filters at these nodes.. 
This is particularly so with 419 mails. Available 
benchmarks though promising, still reveals 
some degrees of inefficiency when compared 
with the rate of false positives (Process 
Software, 2007). SPAMAng, an outbound 
filtering to combat Nigerian Fraudulent 419 
mails from the source was proposed in [24] 
Other major challenges are discussed below: 
(a) The fact that the design of efficient 
filtering systems depends on spamicity 
measures means that accuracy must 
be a goal when designing antispam 
systems. Accurate spamicity 
measures can only be obtained if the 
filter designers have a balanced 
corpus of Spam and real mails (ham) 
from the domain at which the filtering 
efforts are targeted. Unfortunately, 
most Spam designers have easy 
access to the Nigerian 419 mail 
corpus but are disadvantaged at 
having a corpus of ham mails 
originating from the source at which 
the Spam mails  have emanated. The 
consequences of these are the 
occurrence of false positives, false 
negatives and lack of efficiency in the 
filtering systems. The contribution of 
Spam mails in training the text 
classification engine is as important as 
that of ham mails.  
(b) Generic filtering, where a single 
filtering package is designed to filter 
different types of Spam becomes 
disadvantageous in a situation where 
there is serious deviations in the test 
categories and manipulations by 
Spammers in specific domain. This is 
a major challenge of using existing 
filters to deal with the Nigerian 419 
mails. Rule-based approaches are as 
deficient as non-domain specific 
approaches in filtering junk mails that 
have diversified text categories. This is 
due to the fact that logical rule sets 
usually make rigid binary decisions as 
to whether to classify a given message 
as junk [30].  
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2.3 Challenges of Collaborative  
      Filtering Against 419 Mails  
 
Alan and Mards [20] suggested movement of  
spam filters away from monolithic repositories 
situated on central servers towards dynamic 
knowledge bases located on local servers. 
They see content-based filters tending towards 
collaborative filters, whereby email is filtered at 
the mail server using content-based 
techniques, with users feeding information 
back about false positives and false negatives. 
This feedback enables the spam filter to track 
concept drift in spam and to be retrained in the 
case of false positives. While these filters can 
achieve statistically impressive accuracy rates, 
they remain prone to false positives.  
 
We feel that another important but highly 
neglected factor is the validation of the identity 
of the client that is feeding information back 
about false positives and false negatives. Are 
they casual e-mailers or spammers? If they 
are spammers, then collaborative filtering in 
the context of this paper is prone to creating 
more troubles for the troubled. Sadly, the 
“mark as spam”  features provided to enable 
feedbacks about wrong classifications in most 
e-mail platforms are used by unscrupulous 
Nigerian 419 spammers to fool Bayesian 
filters. Most classification mechanisms in email 
applications require users to place messages 
into fixed categories. As a result of the fact that 
categories shifts, placing the onus of 
categorizing and recategorizing e-mail either 
as spam or ham on the users requires a 
refinement policy that can assist users in 
making such fuzzy decisions.  People’s 
categories shift over time, and frequently 
become dated and decline in usefulness. 
Recategorization is time-consuming because 
users must move each message to the new 
category. Often old categories are never fully 
removed after recategorization leading to 
“category drift.” [22][23]. Subject line drifts are 
also used in which the subject line is aligned 
with the sender identity. For instance the 
sender identity reads FROM LONGE 
OLUMIDE and the subject line also reads 
FROM LONGE OLUMIDE 
 
Parasitic spamming is another method 
adopted by the Nigerian Spammer.  If a user’s 
machine has been compromized by a 
spammer (or his proxy), any aspect of the 
machine can be subverted. While current bots 
merely use their own SMTP program to send 
out spam, another alternative is to hook into 
the existing TCP/IP stack or MAPI 
infrastructure (on Windows). In a p-spam-bot, 
this hook would be used to monitor for email 
being sent from the system, which is then 
modified to contain spam as well as the 
original message. The spam has therefore 
effectively parastically ‘infected’ the original 
message, hence the name ‘parasitic spam’. 
Likewise, if an email server or relay is 
compromised, the spammer will have access 
to a greater volume of email to which to attach 
spam. The concept of modifying legitimate 
email is not new. There has been the dubious 
custom of free email services and some 
mailing lists to append an advertisement or 
some other message as a signature to the 
email (see Fig. 1). Because these ‘signatures’ 
are often perceived as a nuisance in mailing 
lists, some mailing list software include tools 
for stripping these signatures. This works 
because the ads tend to be fairly predictable 
and false positives can be kept to a minimum, 
just like parasitic viruses. P-spam is similar, 
but trickier, because the message can be 
altered in many more ways than just in the 
signature.  
 
 
3.0 COMPUTING SPAMICITY 
 
Once a filter has the list of tokens in a 
message, it computes the probability that the 
appearance of the word in a message makes 
the message Spam or ham (real mails) as a 
factor of the frequency of occurrence of the 
same words in the token databases. This 
probability value assigned to each word is 
commonly referred to as spamicity, and ranges 
from 0.0 to 1.0.  A spamicity value greater than 
0.5 means that a message containing the word 
is likely to be Spam, while a spamicity value 
less than 0.5 indicates that a message 
containing the word is likely to be ham.  A 
spamicity value of 0.5 is neutral, meaning that 
it has no effect on the decision as to whether a 
message is Spam or not. 
  
In simplest terms, the spamicity is based on 
the number of times a word occurs in Spam 
messages as opposed to the number of times 
it occurs in non-Spam messages.  For 
example, if a word has occurred 50 times in 
Spam messages but only 2 times in non-Spam 
messages, a message that contains it has a 
good chance of being Spam.  The opposite is 
also true. If a word appears 50 times in non-
Spam messages but only 2 times in Spam 
messages, a message that contains it is not 
very likely to be Spam.  The neutral spamicity 
domains are occupied by words that 
commonly occur about the same frequency in 
Spam and non-Spam messages.  
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Expressed mathematically,  
 
FilterTrainingforUsedMessagesHamofNumber
MessagesHaminFrequencyToken
asgivenisobabilityHam =Pr
  
 
FilterTrainingforUsedMessagesSpamofNumber
MessagesSpaminFrequencyToken
obabilitySpam =Pr
  
 
)PrPr(
Pr
obabilitySpamobabilityHam
obabilitySpam
Spamicity
+
=
  
 
 
In basic terms, Bayes’ Formula allows us to 
determine the probability of an event occurring 
based on the probabilities of two or more 
independent evidentiary events.  Assuming 
that the variables a and b are the probabilities 
of two evidentiary events, the probability would 
be equal to: 
 
)1()1(Pr baab
ab
obability
−−+
=
   
  
For three evidentiary events a, b, and c, the 
formula expands so the probability is equal to: 
 
)1()1()1(Pr cbaab
abc
obability
−−−+
=
  
 
In this fashion, the formula can be expanded to 
accommodate any number of evidentiary 
events. 
 
3.1 Creating Bayesian Token  
      Database 
 
Before mails can be filtered correctly using 
Bayesian statistics, the filter designer needs to 
generate a history for each word or token 
(such as the $ sign, IP addresses, domains 
etc.) A probability value is then assigned to 
each word or token; the probability is based on 
calculations that take into account how often 
that word occurs in spam as opposed to 
legitimate mail. In our approach, this will be 
done by analyzing the users' outbound mail 
and by analyzing known spam. All the words 
and tokens in both pools of mail are analyzed 
to generate the probability that a particular 
word is spam. For example, if the word 
"mortgage" occurs in 400 of 3,000 spam mails 
and 5 out of 300 legitimate e-mails, its spam 
probability is: 
 
(400/3000) / (5/300 + 400/3000) = 0.8889. 
 
 
3.2 Designing Efficient Filtering  
     Systems  
The fact that the design of efficient filtering 
systems depends on spamicity measures 
means that accuracy must be a goal when 
designing Antispam systems. Accurate 
spamicity measures can only be obtained if the 
filter designers have a balanced corpus of 
Spam and real mails  (ham) from the 
domain at which the filtering efforts are 
targeted. Unfortunately, most Spam filter 
designers have easy access to the Nigerian 
419 mail corpus but are disadvantaged at 
having a corpus of ham mails originating from 
the source at which filtering is targeted hence 
the occurrence of false positives, false 
negatives and lack of efficiency in the 
filtering systems.  
 
The contribution of Spam mails in training the 
text classification engine is as important as 
that of ham mails. Secondly, generic filtering, 
where a single Antispam system is designed to 
filter different types of Spam becomes 
disadvantageous in a situation where there is 
serious deviations in the text categories and 
manipulations by Spammers in specific 
domain. This is a major challenge of using 
existing filters to deal with the Nigerian 419 
mails. Rule-based approaches are as deficient 
as non-domain specific approaches in filtering 
junk mails that have diversified text categories. 
This is due to the fact that logical rule sets 
usually make rigid binary decisions as to 
whether to classify a given message as junk or 
not [30]  
 
The most important factor on which a 
Bayesian filters based its decision to flag a 
message as Spam or ham is the message 
content. This decision is aided  by tokenizing 
the message in the form of a table of text 
categories identified in Spam and non-Spam 
messages. These tokens are then compared 
with the ones in the Spam and non-Spam 
database tokens with which the antispam 
system has been trained in order to determine 
the Spamicity of the identified tokens. It follows 
then, that the ability of the filter designer to 
train the antispam with the right tokens with 
high Spamicity  (in the case of Spam) will 
enhance the efficiency of the filtering system in 
quickly identifying Spam messages. The 
opposite is also true for ham (words with low 
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Spamicity must be used to train the filter in 
order to identify ham correctly. In most cases, 
words common to both ham and Spam 
possess low spamicity values. We have 
identified a corpus of text categories with high 
spamicity within the “Nigerian 419”  or “yahoo” 
mails.  
 
 
3.3 Spamicity Measures  
 
Different forms of Spam have peculiarities in 
the use of language. Therefore an 
understanding of the nature of text categories 
and possible manipulations by spammers to 
fool Spam filters within specific Spam corpus is 
imperative in the design of effective filters.  
 
 
3.3.1 Training Sets  
 
Building on an earlier research (Longe et al, 
2007) we improved on the training text for 
NIMFilter to train the text classification engine 
for the development of SPAMAng (SPAM 
Management for Nigerian Mails), an outbound 
filtering antispam system. A total of 112700 
mails partitioned into two equal halves were 
used for the experiment. These mails were 
harvested over a three year period. Existing 
corpus at the 419 coalition website, Nigerian 
Fraud Mail Gallery, Process Software Website, 
the Ling Corpus and other Spam mails sent 
into mail accounts specifically opened for this 
research constitute the manually identified 
Spam messages used for determining the 
Spamicity of text categories. The ham 
messages consists of regular mailing contents 
common to the Nigerian e-mailer in order to 
balance the filtering capacity. An observation 
of profiled mails showed that the 419  
Spammers use some subtle manipulations 
such as word stemming, deliberate spelling 
errors, word toggles, insertion of underscores 
and a combination of American and British 
English to fool Spam filters.  
 
3.3.2 Finding Spam Based on the 
Bayesian Filter – A Simple Example  
Suppose that Virgin Nigeria Airlines  flights 
between Lagos and New York City are 
delayed 75% of the time if it’s raining.  Also 
suppose that if a flight is scheduled to leave 
Lagos before noon, it’s only delayed 10% 
percent of the time (rain or shine).  If  you take 
a Virgin Nigeria flight from Lagos  to New York 
City on a rainy day, and the flight is scheduled 
to depart before noon, what are the odds the 
flight will be delayed? Since there are only two 
pieces of evidence to consider (the weather 
conditions and the scheduled departure time), 
we can use the basic form of Bayes’ Formula 
to solve this problem.  The probability that the 
flight will be delayed on a rainy day (75%, or 
0.75) is represented by the variable a, and the 
probability that the flight will be delayed if it’s 
scheduled to leave before noon (10%, or 0.10) 
is represented by the variable b. 
  
Filling in Bayes’ Formula from above, we see 
that the probability is equal to: 
  
25.0
0.10) - 0.75)(1  (1  0)(0.75)(0.1
0)(0.75)(0.1Pr =
+
=obability  
……(14)  
 
Solving this equation yields a probability of 
0.25, or a 25% chance that the  flight will be 
delayed. 
 
  
3.3.3 Observation  
 
An important observation from this example is 
that we’re dealing with independent events – 
the probability of one event has no impact on 
the other event.  In the case of our example, 
there’s a 75% chance the flight will be delayed 
on a rainy day regardless of whether or not it’s 
scheduled to leave before noon.  The 
probability of 75% includes both cases where 
the flight leaves before noon, and cases where 
it doesn’t.  Likewise, the fact that there’s a 
10% chance of the flight being delayed if it 
leaves before noon takes into account all 
flights – not just ones that leave on rainy days.   
  
Using this concept to filter spam messages is 
known as naive Bayesian filtering, because we 
don’t take into account the relationships 
between the various words contained in e-mail 
messages.  While it may certainly be true that 
a message containing all three of the words 
“clinical”, “trial”, and “Viagra” is never spam, all 
the naive Bayesian filter knows is that the 
words “clinical” and “trial” occur mostly in non-
spam messages while the word “Viagra” 
occurs mostly in spam messages.   
 
4. Data Analysis 
Since a major challenge in filtering is the level 
of precision and recall, ham messages that fall 
into other categories of Internet 
correspondence peculiar to the Nigerian 
internet terrain were selected for use. These 
constitute the major content that can produce 
false positives as they contend with Spam 
mails in the filtering system. The Tables below  
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presents carefully selected text categories in 
Nigerian Scam mails messages, their 
frequency of occurrence, Spam probabilities, 
ham probabilities and Spamicity in descending 
order.  Table 1 reveals the nature of 
manipulations some of the selected words are 
subjected to by Spammers in order to fool 
Spam filters. Tables 2 and 3  presents our 
observation of the changes in Spamicity as 
observed when some of the selected words 
were manipulated in one way or the other in 
Spam mails.  
 
 
Table 1: Token Manipulations And Their  
              Frequencies Of Occurrence 
Token 
Compounded/ 
Manipulate 
 
Nature of 
Manipulation 
Frequency of 
Occurrence in 
Spam 
Messages 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
in Ham 
Messages  
Beneficiary Beneficary 
(spelling) 
13 0 
Cooperation Co-operation 
(hyphenation) 
32 09 
Date Date ofbirth 
(compound/spelli
ng) 
34 0 
Director Directr (spelling) 
DIrector (Toggle)  
23 
45 
0 
0 
Discovered Disc0vred 
(spelling) 
35 0 
Documents  DOCUMENt  
(Toggle) 
21 0 
Dollar Dolar (spelling)  
Dollarrs 
(Spelling)  
27 
09 
3 
1 
Fax Faxnumber 
(compound)  
53 5 
First Firstname 
(compound) 
3 23 
Foreign  Foreing 
(Spelling) 
Foreign Account 
(compound)  
27 
45 
1 
15 
Funds  Funds-transfer 
(compund/hyphe
nated) 
Fund-transfer 
(compund) 
Fun-transfer 
(Spelling error)  
65 
75 
08 
05 
0 
0 
Invoice Invoce (Spelling 
Error) 
Over-invoiced 
(Compound) 
Over-invoice 
(Grammar) 
26 
32 
32 
1 
1 
0 
Joint J0int (Toggle) 
Jonit-business 
(compound) 
15 
2 
0 
0 
Lottery LOTTERy 
(Toggle)   
Lotery  
15 
5 
0 
0 
Mobile  MobiLe (toggle)  
Mobile-number 
(hyphen/Compo
und) 
12 
55 
0 
8 
Next Nxt (spelling) 
Next-of-kin 
Next_of-Kin 
(Toggle/undersc
ore) 
Nextofkin 
(Compound) 
5 
98 
18 
27 
0 
5 
0 
0 
Offset Off-set 
(hyphenation) 
 12 
Partners Partiners 
(spelling) 
Pcitners 
(stemming)  
23 
19 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Changes In Frequency of                 
             Occurrence For Selected Tokens 
S/NO 
 
Token Old 
Frequency 
in Spam 
messages 
New  
Frequency 
in Spam 
messages 
Old 
Frequency 
in Ham 
Messages 
New 
Frequency 
in Ham 
Messages 
1 Beneficiary  277 290 7 7 
2 Cooperation 104 136 12 21 
3 Director  291 359 13 13 
4 Discovered 237 272 16 16 
5 Documents 398 419 121 121 
6 Dollar 676 712 93 97 
7 Invoice  100 126 12 13 
8 Joint 187 202 25 25 
9 Lottery 765 795 2 2 
10 Mobile  767 779 324 324 
11 Next 895 900 234 234 
12 Partner 34 76 12 12 
13 Personal 102 114 30 30 
14 Please 2800 2899 223 227 
15 Swift  109 121 5 5 
16 Transferred 134 193 56 58 
 
 
Table 3: Observation Of The Changes In  
             SpamicitiesFor Selected Tokens 
Old Spam 
Probabilitie
s 
New Spam 
Probabilities 
Old Ham 
Probabilitie
s 
New Ham 
Probabilities 
Old 
Spamiciti
es 
New 
Spamicity 
0.1154167 0.120833333 0.0029167 0.002916667 
0.975352 
1 
0.0433333 0.056666667 0.005 0.00875 0.896552 1 
0.12125 0.149583333 0.0054167 0.005416667 
0.957237 
1 
0.09875 0.113333333 0.0066667 0.006666667 
0.936759 
1 
0.1658333 0.174583333 0.0504167 0.050416667 
0.766859 
1 
0.2816667 0.296666667 0.03875 0.040416667 
0.879064 
1 
0.0416667 0.0525 0.005 0.005416667 
0.892857 
1 
0.0779167 0.084166667 0.0104167 0.010416667 
0.882075 
1 
0.31875 0.33125 0.0008333 0.000833333 
0.997392 
1 
0.3195833 0.324583333 0.135 0.135 
0.703025 
1 
0.3729167 0.375 0.0975 0.0975 
0.792737 
1 
0.0141667 0.031666667 0.005 0.005 
0.73913 
1 
0.0425 0.0475 0.0125 0.0125 
0.772727 
1 
1.1666667 1.207916667 0.0929167 0.094583333 
0.926232 
1 
0.0454167 0.050416667 0.0020833 0.002083333 
0.95614 
1 
0.0558333 0.080416667 0.0233333 0.024166667 
0.705263 
1 
 
Figures  3(a-f5) depicts the graphical status of 
text categories as the computation progresses. 
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Fig 3(a): Changes in Frequencies Spam 
Messages  
 
 
Fig 3(b): Changes in Frequencies in Ham 
Messages  
 
 
 
 
Fig 3(c): Additional Occurrences in Spam by 
Manipulation   
 
 
 
Fig 3.(d): Old and New Spam Probabilities  
 
 
Fig 3(e): New Ham Probabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.(f): Old and New Spamicities 
 
 
VI  EXPERIMENTAL ON 419 SPAMMING  
     TECHNIQUES  
 
We analyzed a set of preselected 419 spam 
mails numbering 1200 categorized as shown 
in the table below. Similar characteristics in 
some of the mail necessitated  collapsing them 
into the same spamming domain. Results from 
the analysis carried out by 3 groups of 
researchers are depicted  in the Fig 4 and 5 
and summarized Table 4 below.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Graph of Individual Group Responses 
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Table 4: Categories of Spam Mails  
 
 
Fig. 5 Graph of Cumulative Group responses  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Effort at developing SPAMAng for filtering 
fraudulent mails from the origin necessitates 
the adoption of the Bayesian model of filtering. 
We are therefore confronted with the usual 
challenge that  Bayesian filters require the 
entire message to be received before analysis 
and are resource intensive since calculating 
Bayesian probabilities requires significantly 
more processing power than simply querying a 
list. Therefore any form of improvement on 
spamicity information, or the selection of 
tokens that aids the calculation of spamicity in 
order to quickly specify tokens with high 
Spamicities is a welcome development that will 
help filters achieve a higher precision, efficient 
recall and consequently low false positives.  
 
Apart from his own mentality and the strength of 
his motivations, the criminal also needs to see 
the path of crime ahead of him clear of 
obstacles. If every single individual were to put 
up obstacles of their own, no matter how small, 
the crime path will seem to be far less lucrative 
in the eyes of even the most desperate criminal. 
The outbound mail filtering paradigm is an 
alternative that must be rigorously explored in 
the fight against 419 spam mails. The Internet 
community must engage in a collective effort 
to curb the Internet of the demeaning crimes it 
is helping to fuel.  
 
Different forms of Spam have peculiarities in 
the use of language. Therefore an 
understanding of the nature of text categories 
and possible manipulations by Spammers to 
fool Spam filters within specific Spam domain 
is imperative in the design of effective filters.  
Total spamicity improves as a result of the 
increase in content spamicity made available 
by identifying possible text manipulations.  
Spamming Technique No Of  Mails In Category  
By Groups  
 
 Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3  TOTAL  
Simple Subject Line: 
Spammers use a one-word 
subject line. Usually there is 
nothing more than a link in 
the body of the e-mail, 
which allow many e-mails to 
slide by the server 
undetected. 
67 98 79 244 
2 Phishing: Phishing is usually 
combined with spoofing. A 
spoofer will imitate 
companies and use forms 
inside of e-mails to gather 
personal information about 
the user. Spoofing: This is 
e-mail in which the sender's 
name is fictitious. 419 
spammers spoof real 
companies.  Domain 
Spoofing - Using an invalid 
or fake domain in the from 
line 
345 234 301 880 
3 Social Engineering: A 
common tactic is using a 
personal, and even touching 
subject lines to get a person 
to open spammer e-mail. 
“Hello,” “I miss you,” and 
“Your document is 
attached”  
325 237 304 866 
4 Web beacons: E-mails sent 
by spammers that contain 
an image and sometimes an 
invisible image to the 
recipient.  
54 87 69 210 
5 Specify "<>" : One of the 
most commonly used 
tactics is to specify "<>" as 
the sender. This tactic is 
based on a standard 
feature, present in all mail 
servers. By specifying the 
"<>" sender, they trick the 
server to deliver the 
message to the user's 
mailbox, since the "<>" 
corresponds to the server 
itself.  
113 165 134 412 
6 Forging the Sender &  
Sender Header: Specify the 
same information to the 
sender header as to the 
recipient header, to look like 
the message. Another filter 
bypassing tactic is to forge 
the sender and specify the 
same information to the 
sender header as to the 
recipient header, to look like 
the message was sent from 
the recipient's owner's 
account to himself.   
106 176 142 424 
7 Verification/confirmation of 
delivery: Spammers try to 
validate the aexistemnce of 
addresses by using 
software such as High 
Speed Verifier, or by 
tricking the receipt into 
manually verifying the e-
mail by asking him or her to 
“unsubscribe”.  
97 87 107 291 
8 Confusing Bayesian: 
Crafting messages to 
confuse and disturb 
statistic or keyword filters 
that use the Bayes 
algorithm. Word 
Obscuring/obfuscation - 
Text Manipulations, 
misspelling words, putting 
words into images, word 
toggling, toggling words 
and numbers etc. MIME 
Attacks - Putting non-spam 
content in one body part 
and spam content in 
another. Character 
Encoding - Phar&#109;acy 
renders into Pharmacy. 
534 497 452 1483 
9 Academic Attack - 
Resending and forging 
conference and journal 
invitations 
165 124 156 445 
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The lessons learned when training the 
SPAMAng’s text classification engine based 
on our findings are as follows: 
(a) All compound and hyphenated words 
should be tokenized. Hyphenations 
can be removed. 
(b) Spell checking will assist in removing 
deliberate errors, mixture of alphabets 
and texts(as in J0INT; note that zero is 
used instead of the alphabet 0)  and 
word-stemming by matching 
acceptable English words in the 
database with that on the mail.  
(c) Convert all mails to upper or lower 
case to deal with text toggling.  
(d) Underscores within mail contents 
should be removed except when 
referring to an e-mail address. All 
messages should be converted  to 
either American or British texts using 
specific dictionary.  
 
Fighting spam must be a collaborative effort, 
which will benefit from using tools and 
standards that aid in exchanging information 
and performing coordination. To this end, 
standard methods of reporting spamming 
events, of characterizing particular spam, and 
of sending spam control data can be helpful. 
Some work in that direction should be 
encouraged. Fighting spam also requires 
global operations collaboration; this will be 
aided by services to facilitate interactions 
between network administrators speaking 
different languages as well as law enforcement 
agencies across nations. It is also likely that 
there should be standards for the syntax and 
semantics of whitelists and blacklists in 
inbound mail filtering systems. On a more 
general note, e-mail addresses are very 
valuable commodities using them wisely can 
help users avoid both the junk e-mail and the 
frustration of dealing with them. Users can 
protect their inboxes from spam by following 
the simple rules listed below: 
 
[1] Never accept the option to “click here to 
unsubscribe” or send a reply. That tells the 
spammer that they have a valid e-mail 
address. E-mail users may actually start 
getting MORE spam instead!  
 
[2] When submitting forms over the Web, opt 
out of any newsletter or mailing list. Many 
companies share or sell their e-mail lists so 
once users are on their list, they will soon be 
on another, and another, and another.  
 
[3] Refrain from forwarding chain letters, 
humor, news flashes, or even family 
messages. Spammers receive these 
messages too, and then extract the embedded 
address list for their own use.  
 
[4] Use a disposable e-mail address (Yahoo! 
®, AOL ®, etc.) when registering with retail 
Web sites or message boards. These are 
sure-fire targets for spam. By using a different 
address, you can keep your business address 
clean.  
 
[5] Select longer, more complicated e-mail 
names. Shorter addresses tend to receive 
more spam mail than longer ones, according 
to The Center for Democracy and Technology, 
a policy group.  
 
[6] Provide a different address for your friends 
and family. You may be careful with your 
business address, but if a friend or relative lets 
your address get out, all your other efforts are 
wasted.  
 
[7] Run an anti-virus engine on your home PC 
and keep it current. Many viruses target the 
Outlook address list. If your home PC is used 
for work it has all of your important addresses. 
A personal firewall is a good idea too.  
 
[8] Treat your e-mail address with respect. 
Give it out with the same consideration you 
use for your home address or personal cell 
phone number.  
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